In a deterministic contest or all-pay auction, all rents are dissipated when information is complete and contestants are identical. As one contestant becomes "stronger", that is, values the prize more, total expenditures are known to decrease monotonically. Thus, asymmetry among contestants reduces competition and rent dissipation. Recently, this result has been shown to hold for other, non-deterministic, contest success functions as well, thereby suggesting a certain robustness. In this paper, however, the complete information assumption is shown to be crucial. I examine a tractable incomplete information model for which the complete information model is a special case. With incomplete information -regardless of how little -total expenditures in a deterministic two-player contest increase when one contestant becomes marginally stronger, starting from a symmetric contest. In fact, both contestants expend resources more aggressively; with complete information, neither of them do so. Thus, there is a "discontinuity" in the information structure. JEL Classi…cation Numbers: C72, D44, D72, D82.
Introduction
Tullock's (1967, 1980 ) famous pair of papers have triggered a large literature on rent seeking. In large part, the focus of this literature is on the wasteful use of resources to contest rents. Applications thus include war, litigation, lobbying, and campaign spending, to mention but a few. Usually, complete information is assumed. That is, the value that each contestant place on winning the prize is common knowledge. 1 Simply put, the objective of this paper is to show that some of the important …ndings of this literature are not necessarily robust to the inclusion of incomplete information.
Consider a deterministic contest, or all-pay auction. In such a contest, the contestant who expends the most resources wins the prize with probability one. Assume there are two contestants, and that contestant i is known to value the prize at v i , i = 1; 2. These rules and payo¤s de…ne a complete information game. The game has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies; contestants randomize to keep the opposition guessing. See Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) for details. If v 1 v 2 , the expected expenditures of contestants 1 and 2 are, respectively,
and EP 
If the contest is symmetric, or v 1 = v 2 , then all rents are dissipated since EP c 1 + EP c 2 = v 2 . However, in many cases the contest is not symmetric. Hillman and Riley (1989) point out that an incumbent may value the prize more than a challenger. Nti (1999) lists a plethora of other examples. As v 1 increases beyond v 2 , neither contestant becomes more aggressive. More precisely, contestant 1's expected expenditures are unchanged, while contestant 2's expected expenditures decline. As a corollary, total expenditures are strictly decreasing in v 1 , for v 1 v 2 .
The conclusion is that asymmetries among contestants are detrimental to competition, and, as a result, there is less dissipation of rent in the …ght for the prize. 1 For instance, in Konrad's (2009) textbook, incomplete information is discussed only sparingly. Likewise, in their collection of papers on rent seeking, Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad (2008) include only two papers, Wärneryd (2003) and Malueg and Yates (2004) , which focus explicitly on incomplete information. Malueg and Yates (2004) concentrate on the Tullock contest; see Fey (2008) for a similar model. Wärneryd (2003) considers common value contests in which one contestant is uncertain of what that value is. Hurley and Shogren (1998) also examine one-sided incomplete information in a Tullock contest. Hillman and Riley (1989) consider two-sided incomplete information in a deterministic contest, assuming contestants are symmetric ex ante. Building on Amann and Leininger (1996) , the current paper allows contestants to be asymmetric ex ante. 2 As in much of the literature, the focus here is on the absolute level of rent dissipation, not the relative level. Moreover, this paper is concerned only with one-shot, simultaneous contests. See e.g. Amegashie (2006) and Konrad (2009) for discussions of dynamics in contests.
These comparative statics provide a key building block in other studies, most prominently in Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries' (1993) seminal paper on the "exclusion principle". The robustness of the results is therefore of interest. 3 The preceding contest is extreme on at least two dimensions. First, the contest is deterministic; there is no room for luck or random factors to in ‡uence the outcome. However, the comparative statics have recently been shown to be robust to changes in the contest success function. Che and Gale (2000) and Alcalde and Dahm (2010) each consider a class of (mutually exclusive) contest success functions for which the deterministic contest is a limiting case. In both cases, there is an equilibrium for which expenditures are given by (1) whenever the contest success function is "su¢ -ciently close" to the deterministic success function, in the sense that a contestant's winning probability increases dramatically enough when he unilaterally increases his expenditures, starting from a position of equal expenditures. 4 Second, the contest assumes complete information. It is natural to ask whether the comparative statics are also robust to changes in the underlying information structure. While there are many ways to model incomplete information, I will pursue a particularly tractable incomplete information model, recently introduced by Kirkegaard (2011) . The model shares many features with the complete information model and allows any bidder's strength to be captured by a single variable. In fact, the complete information model can be seen as a special case of the model examined here. Section 2 provides additional motivation for the model choice.
Starting from a symmetric contest, with incomplete information a marginal increase in bidder 1's strength causes the expected expenditures of both contestants to strictly increase. As a corollary, total expected expenditures strictly increase. Clearly, incomplete information gives rise to precisely the opposite comparative statics than complete information, at least when the asymmetry is small.
The following example demonstrates the main point. Assume bidder i, i = 1; 2, draws his valuation from the distribution function
where v 1 v 2 and " is a small but positive number, " 2 (0; 1]. Ex ante, bidders di¤er only with respect to v i , which can then be used as a measure of their strength. The density is strictly positive everywhere, as long as " > 0.
hence, all mass is concentrated close to v = v i . If " = 0, the distribution is degenerate (information is complete). The point is that the comparative statics for " = 0 are the opposite of those arising for any strictly positive ". Thus, in this model there is an intriguing "discontinuity" with respect to the information structure. Complete information is a knife-edge. 5 
Model
The contest is assumed to take the form of an all-pay auction. Hence, the auction terminology will be used. Amann and Leininger (1996, Lemmata 1 -5) provide an implicit characterization of equilibrium in this general model. 6 Both bidders submit strictly positive bids with probability one (i.e. whenever their type is non-zero) and they both employ pure strategies that are strictly increasing in type. 7 The equilibrium is unique (Amann and Leininger (1996, Theorem 1)).
However, more structure will be imposed on F 1 and F 2 in the current paper, in order to facilitate comparison with the complete information model. The following model was …rst introduced by Kirkegaard (2011) . However, he considers F 1 and F 2 to be …xed, and instead asks whether the auctioneer would pro…t from handicapping 5 However, there are many other ways incomplete information could be modeled. Thus, to be accurate, this paper merely establishes an environment in which incomplete information leads to di¤erent comparative statics than complete information. 6 Technically, Amann and Leininger (1996) assume that v 1 = v 2 . However, none of their results rely on this assumption. 7 Incomplete information puri…es the strategies. The working paper compares the strategic e¤ects of increased asymmetry in the complete and incomplete information models more fully.
one of the bidders. The comparative statics examined in this paper are thus along a di¤erent dimension. 8 Assume that
where F is a distribution function with the aforementioned properties on its support, [0; 1]. Let f > 0 denote its density. The example in the introduction …ts this model. Note that the complete information model can be seen as a special case, although F is of course degenerate in that case. 
the two distributions have the exact same shape, but are of di¤erent scale to …t onto their respective supports. This can also be seen from the relationship
Note that F 1 …rst order stochastically dominates F 2 whenever v 1 > v 2 . That is, bidder 1 is less likely to have a low type than bidder 2; he is perceived to be stronger. Let EV i denote the expected value of v i , i = 1; 2, and let EV F denote the expected value of a draw from the distribution function F . Then, substituting the scaleadjusted type for the actual type (at the second-to-last equality) yields
Thus, for a …xed distribution, F , v i is a natural measure of the (absolute) strength of bidder i, as evidenced by (2) and (3). Therefore, v i will be used as the basis for comparative statics. Let Kirkegaard (2011) is best compared to Fu (2006) . The latter …nds that the optimal handicap in a complete information model precisely nulli…es the strong bidder's advantage. In the incomplete information model, however, Kirkegaard (2011) shows that the weak bidder should be "overcompensated" and thus wins more often than the strong bidder. 9 Speci…cally, in the complete information model,
denote bidder i's relative strength, i = 1; 2, i 6 = j. The lower r i is, the stronger bidder i is compared to bidder j.
Compared to the benchmark model with complete information, the partial overlap of the supports implies that bidder 2 may happen to have a higher type than bidder 1, even if v 1 > v 2 . However, the probability of this event can be made arbitrarily small by concentrating most of the probability mass of F close to 1 (e.g. let F be "very convex"). See also the example in the Introduction.
The remainder of this section describes the equilibrium and the expected payments, for a …xed (v 1 ; v 2 ) pair.
Equilibrium and expected payments
Since strategies are strictly increasing, bidder i with type v must submit the exact same bid as bidder j with some, possibly di¤erent, type, k ij (v), i; j = 1; 2, i 6 = j. Thus, bidder i wins if bidder j's type is below k ij (v). Since strictly positive bids are submitted whenever v > 0, it must be the case that k ij (0) = 0. Likewise, k ij (v i ) = v j must also hold. Otherwise, one bidder would irrationally be submitting bids that are strictly higher than is required to win with certainty.
Amann and Leininger's (1996) contribution is to supply an implicit characterization of the function
10 The function is derived from the bidders'…rst order conditions, which form an autonomous system of di¤erential equations. The boundary condition is k ij (v i ) = v j . In the present model, however, it is convenient to express the allocation in terms of the scale-adjusted types. 
for all v s 2 (0; 1]. The details are omitted from the present paper, but they can be found in Kirkegaard (2011, Section 5).
For a …xed distribution, F , k
is determined exclusively by the relative strength of bidder i, r i . As the purpose of the analysis is to vary v i , the function will be written as k s ij (v s jr i ) whenever the reliance on the relative strength needs to be made explicit. As bidder i becomes stronger, or r i falls, k s ij (v s ) must strictly increase to maintain the equality in (4), for any v s 2 (0; 1). Thus, for a …xed scale-adjusted type, bidder i wins more often the stronger he is.
If 1996) use k ij to derive bidding strategies. The expected bid can then be calculated. The alternative is to use Myerson's (1981) insight that the allocation in any given mechanism permits EP i (v i ; v j ) to be calculated directly, without …rst having to deduce bidding strategies. Kirkegaard (2011) uses the second method to obtain the key property that EP i (v i ; v j ) is separable in the bidder's absolute strength, v i , and relative strength, r i . 11 As will be demonstrated shortly, the complete information model has the same property. Lemma 2 summarizes Kirkegaard's (2011) results.
Lemma 2 Bidder i's payment can be written
where
EP s is di¤erentiable in r i and has the property that EP s0 (1) > 0.
Proof. Here it will be proven only that EP i (v i ; v j ) is separable, as stated in (5) . Proving the remainder of the Lemma is more involved. For completeness, the Appendix reproduces the proof in Kirkegaard (2011, Lemma 3).
Since a bidder with type zero earns zero rent, it follows from Myerson (1981) that bidder i's ex ante expected payment is
Substituting in the scale-adjusted type,
, then yields
which takes the form (5). Integration by parts produces (6) . Before examining the implications of Lemma 2, it is interesting to compare (5) and its counterpart in the complete information model, (1) . The latter can also be written in a separable form,
where r 
Note that EP c is not di¤erentiable at r c i = 1, where it peaks. In contrast, EP s is everywhere di¤erentiable and does not peak at r i = 1. This di¤erence turns out to be instrumental in explaining the di¤erent results in the two models.
Inserting (6) into (5) and recalling that v i r i = v j yield
It is sometimes emphasized that all rents are dissipated in a symmetric complete information all-pay auction, but not in a symmetric incomplete information all-pay auction. Bidders earn "information rent"in the latter. Nevertheless, from (9) 
Hence, as with complete information, each bidder pays half the expected value of the second highest type. The di¤erence is that there is no wedge between the highest and second highest type in a symmetric complete information model.
Comparative Statics
Consider the individual responses to changes in v i .
Proposition 1 EP i (v i ; v j ) is strictly increasing in v i and non-monotonic in v j , with
Proof. By Lemma 1, k s ij (v s ) is strictly increasing in v i , for all v s 2 (0; 1). Equation (9) then implies that EP i (v i ; v j ) must be strictly increasing in v i as well. From (5),
By Lemma 2, this derivative is strictly positive when evaluated at is nonmonotonic in v j ; increasing in v j as long as v j < v i , and decreasing thereafter. While EP i is also non-monotonic in v j in an incomplete information contest, it does not attain its maximum at v j = v i . In particular, starting from a point of symmetry, v j = v i , bidder i actually becomes more aggressive (in expectation) when his rival becomes marginally stronger, which is precisely the opposite of what happens in the complete information all-pay auction. Figure 1 illustrates the di¤erence between the two models. Note the "kinks" in the complete information model. One e¤ect of incomplete information is to smooth out these kinks.
Since both bidders become more aggressive as one bidder becomes marginally stronger, starting from symmetry, it is an obvious corollary that total payments must increase as well. 13 Thus, in contrast to the complete information model, rent dissipation may be an increasing problem as bidders become asymmetric. 14 To reconcile the di¤erences in the two models'predictions, note that a change in the competitive balance may, in principle, have two distinct e¤ects. The …rst and most obvious e¤ect is that it may change the allocation. The second, and equally interesting e¤ect, is that it may impact the amount of rent bidders are able to appropriate from the contest. However, a key di¤erence between the complete and incomplete information models is the e¤ectiveness with which the all-pay auction robs bidders of rent. In the complete information model, bidder 1 earns expected payo¤ of v 1 v 2 when v 1 v 2 . His "participation constraint" is not binding. It becomes "more slack" as v 1 grows, meaning that the e¤ectiveness of the all-pay auction at extracting rent diminishes as bidder 1 grows stronger. This opens a gap between the all-pay auction and the payment-maximizing mechanism with the same allocation. An all-pay auction that charges bidder 1 a fee to eliminate his rent would yield higher expenditures without a¤ecting the allocation, and those expenditures would be increasing in v 1 .
In comparison, the participation constraints are always binding in the incomplete information model. This property is due to the deliberate assumption that the lowest type is zero. Hence, no other mechanism could extract more rent from bidders 13 When F is uniform and v 2 = 1, the total expected expenditures attains its maximum at v 1 12:3. In other words, bidder 1 must be at least 12 times as strong as bidder 2 in order for further increases in v 1 to reduce total payments. The working paper contains a more detailed discussion of large asymmetries. 14 Baye et al (1993) prove their exclusion principle by utilizing the two properties that in a complete information model, (1) only the two strongest bidders participate, and (2) revenue is decreasing in the valuation of the strongest bidder. Parreiras and Rubinchik (2010) prove the …rst property does not necessarily hold in the incomplete information model. The results in the current paper reveals that the second property need not hold either.
without changing the allocation. Thus, the confounding e¤ect mentioned in the previous paragraph is absent. 15 Changes in v 1 obviously also a¤ect the allocation. These changes can be used to explain why total expenditures increase when bidder 1 becomes marginally stronger, starting from a position of symmetry. To do so, it is worthwhile to note that the change in v 1 changes bidder 1's absolute strength and his relative strength, and to decompose the e¤ects. Since r 2 = r 1 1 , total expected payments can be written as
Now imagine keeping v 1 …xed at v 1 = v 2 , but di¤erentiating (11) with respect to r 1 . Evaluated at r 1 = 1, this derivative is zero in the incomplete information model. The interpretation is that, starting from symmetry, a small change in the relative strength of the bidders has no …rst order e¤ect. In words, bidder 2's expected payment increases when he becomes relatively weaker, but that is precisely o¤set by the decrease in bidder 1's expected payments that is attributable to his increased relative strength. 16 Thus, when v 1 increases marginally, starting from v 1 = v 2 , it is only the change in bidder 1's absolute strength that is important. Total expected expenditures thus increase because bidder 1's willingness to pay is higher.
These observations can be used to understand other comparative statics that can also be meaningfully employed to shed light on the consequences of increased asymmetry. 15 However, it is conceivable that the incomplete information model would yield similar comparative statics to the complete information model if the lowest type in the support is su¢ ciently high. A related literature on auctions with small asymmetries show that total expenditures must increase if one bidder becomes marginally stronger, starting from symmetry; see Fibich et al (2004) and Lebrun (2009) . However, that literature is silent on individual expenditures and technically assumes that the support of F 1 and F 2 are the same. It is also explicitly assumed that the participation constraint is binding for both bidders, which necessitates that the lowest type is zero. 16 Bidder 2's diminished relative strength can be compared to a handicap. As in Kirkegaard (2011), a handicap spurs the bidder to compensate by becoming more aggressive; see Lemma 2.
Proof. The Proposition follows directly from
given that the term in the …rst parenthesis has a stationary point at d = 0 and the term in the second parenthesis is zero at d = 0. Once again, the "kinks" in the complete information model cause small changes to have large e¤ects. In the incomplete information model, it has already been demonstrated that there are no …rst order e¤ects of small changes in relative strength levels. The e¤ects of the changes in the absolute strength of the two bidders exactly cancel out, at d = 0. In this sense, small asymmetries are inconsequential.
Concluding remarks
The dominant assumption in the rent seeking literature is that information is complete. Among the advantages of such models are their analytical simplicity. Although the assumption of incomplete information is almost certainly more realistic, it is a challenge to build a tractable model which allows comparative statics. Such a model is presented in this paper. The model features a one-variable measure of strength, which means that comparative statics in the two models can easily be compared.
The comparative statics are qualitatively di¤erent when incomplete information is present. Indeed, in this model, any amount of incomplete information changes the conclusions. The main result is that ex ante asymmetries may make both contestants more aggressive and thus cause more rent to be dissipated in the pursuit of the prize, contrary to the conclusion that obtains in a complete information model. Thus, asymmetry does not necessarily dampen competition.
Appendix: Proof of the last part of Lemma 2
Equation (4) 
and it follows that
For notational simplicity, subscripts will be suppressed from now on. From (4),
meaning that (12) can be written
The antiderivative of g is
since L'Hopital's rule can be used to show that k s (y) R 1 y f (x)=xdx converges to zero as y converges to zero. Let D(r) denote the last term in (12) or (13) . Using integration by parts,
Rearranging yields 2D(r) + A(r) =
where integration by parts was used to obtain the last part on the right hand side and where
Thus,
Inserting this back into (12) yields @EP s 2 (r) @r = 1 2
Note that the …rst term is strictly positive. If r = 1 then k s (v s ) = v s . Thus, A(1) = 0 and so EP s0 2 (1) > 0.
